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ESSAY 
Rewiring the DNA of Securities Fraud Litigation: 
Amgen’s Missed Opportunity 
Geoffrey Rapp* 
INTRODUCTION 
American judges and policymakers are of two minds when it comes 
to securities fraud litigation.  On the one hand, private class action 
lawsuits to enforce the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws are viewed as a necessary supplement to limited governmental 
resources in an era of ever-increasing complexity in the financial 
industry.1  On the other hand, securities litigation is viewed as 
parasitic,2 ineffective at compensating those who have actually suffered 
harm,3 and as a cumbersome and expensive tax on publicly traded 
companies levied by powerful (but not always publicly minded) 
plaintiff’s’ securities firms.4 
Which of these views is right?  The unsurprising answer is likely 
both, to a degree.  The clear consequences of our schizophrenic view of 
securities litigation can be found both in legislation and case law.  On 
                                                          
 * Harold A. Anderson Professor of Law & Values, The University of Toledo College of Law.  
The author would like to thank Dean Kaufman and the Loyola University of Chicago Institute for 
Investor Protection for the opportunity to have participated in the Second Annual Institute for 
Investor Protection Conference, “Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection.” 
1. See Post-Enron America: An SEC Prospective, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 335, 359 
(2003) (opening remarks by Harvey Goldschmid, then-Commissioner of the SEC and currently 
teaching at Columbia Law School). 
2. Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 16 
(1980); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate 
Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62 (2009–2010) [hereinafter 
Rapp, False Claims]. 
3. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545–46 (2006). 
4. See Demings v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 593 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2010) (describing 
reform objectives of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) as reigning in 
“vexatious class-action suits affecting national securities markets”); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE 
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 485 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining that class action strike suits are 
thought to be brought to obtain “extortionate settlements”); Rapp, False Claims, supra note 2, at 
59 (suggesting that securities lawsuits tax shareholders for the benefit of plaintiffs’ counsel). 
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the legislative side, we embrace new remedies and causes of action in 
investor-friendly statutes, like Sarbanes-Oxley5 and Dodd-Frank.6  But 
we also curb and restrict private securities litigation under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)7 and Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act.8  Inconsistencies can also be found in case law, 
with plaintiff-empowering decisions like Basic Inc. v. Levinson9 
contrasting with pro-defense decisions like Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
v. Broudo.10 
Judicial and political ambivalence about the worth of securities fraud 
litigation manifests itself on an even more granular level.  Rule 10b-5, 
promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
pursuant to its authority under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, prohibits an act or omission resulting in fraud in 
connection with the purchase and sale of a security.11  Although Rule 
                                                          
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. (2006)).  Sarbanes-Oxley sought to expand federal 
power to protect investors and ensure reliable corporate disclosures.  In re Sherman, 658 F.3d 
1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011).  To accomplish this goal, it extended the statute of limitations for 
private securities claims, Lieberman v. Cambridge Partners, LLC, 432 F.3d 482, 485 (3d Cir. 
2005), and required new certifications of corporate disclosures, United States v. Panice, 598 F.3d 
426, 434 (7th Cir. 2010).  
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1367 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2012)).  Dodd-Frank is a “sprawling” 
2319 page statute.  Saunders v. District of Columbia, 789 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011). 
7. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. (2006)).  The PSLRA created heightened pleading requirements, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b), 
and imposed automatic discovery stays in securities lawsuits, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-
4(b)(3)(B).  See generally Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 924–29 (discussing the PSLRA’s heightened pleading and 
automatic discovery stay provisions).  
8. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. (2006)).  The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act provided for federal preemption 
of most aggregate fraud claims involving nationally traded securities.  See generally Richard W. 
Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of 
Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).  
9. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
10. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
11. Rule 10b-5, in part, reads:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of . . . interstate 
commerce[,] . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . .   
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).  Rule 10b-5 implements section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which, in 
part, reads:   
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of . . . interstate 
commerce[,] . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security[,] . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors.”). 
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10b-5 seems clear on its face, courts have engaged in a dizzying back-
and-forth dance when trying to interpret and explain its elements.12 
There is a similar ambivalence about federal enforcement.  The SEC 
is a well-funded agency, at least in a comparative sense, and its 
enforcement attorneys represent some of the most well-regarded legal 
talent in the federal ranks.13  American financial markets are widely 
viewed as the most transparent in the world, and, as the industry’s chief 
regulator, the SEC certainly is entitled to claim some credit for this 
achievement.  At the same time, scholars and commentators are deeply 
concerned about the SEC’s coziness with the industry it regulates14 and 
its capacity to adapt to changes in financial industry practices and 
products.15   
While my prior scholarship has suggested a “third way” that involves 
policy incentives for whistleblowers rather than enforcement through 
government action or private shareholder fraud claims,16 it may be time 
to reconsider more broadly key aspects of securities enforcement and 
litigation. 
I. THE MUDDLED STATE OF SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION 
Securities regulation in this country works well in two regards.  First, 
it works well in the “green light” area where business conduct is 
unlikely to lead to shareholder losses and threaten the integrity of the 
market.  Unmeritorious cases can be disposed of with ease thanks to 
                                                                                                                                      
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).  
12. See DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 15 (3d ed. 2012) (“Important issues . . . remained unresolved for years after first 
being raised, and then left open, by Supreme Court decisions decided on other grounds.”). 
13. See David A. Caragliano, Note, Administrative Governance as Corporate Governance: A 
Partial Explanation for the Growth of China’s Stock Markets, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1273, 1284 
n.65 (2009); James D. Cox et al., Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have 
Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 894 (2005). 
14. James J. Park, Rules, Principles and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 115, 127 (2012); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The 
Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 
BYU L. REV. 73, 138 [hereinafter Rapp, Mutiny]. 
15. Testimony Concerning the Severe Market Disruption on May 6, 2010, Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairwoman, SEC), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2010/ts051110mls.htm (noting that “the technologies used for 
market oversight and surveillance have not kept pace with the technology and trading patterns of 
the rapidly evolving and expanding securities markets”). 
16. Rapp, Mutiny, supra note 14.  My argument has been that policy incentives for 
whistleblowers would do a better job than private shareholder litigation in bringing fraud to light, 
both because whistleblowers have better access to information about ongoing fraud and because 
such litigation could precede, rather than follow, public revelations of fraud.  Policies targeting 
whistleblowers may thus be more effective at supplementing limited enforcement resources. 
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various procedural devices,17 and prosecutorial discretion can balance 
excessive enforcement zeal.  Second, securities regulation works well in 
the “red light” area where dedicated schemers have sought to exploit 
investors.  In the most egregious instances of securities fraud, where 
defendants are unwilling to settle on terms palatable to federal enforcers 
and cases go to trial, the SEC has a notably high success rate.18  It is in 
the “yellow light” area, however, where the law is least coherent and 
least effective. 
In the area of securities fraud, even mature and seemingly well-
understood claims and doctrines remain muddled.19  Although high-
stakes battles have been waged for decades using section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 as theories of liability,20 we are only now, years after the private 
cause of action was embraced, beginning to explore the meaning of key 
aspects of the doctrine—materiality, reliance, scienter, and causation.  
While the problem of keeping elements of an offense or liability rule 
distinct is by no means unique to the realm of securities law,21 it is 
particularly pronounced for two reasons. 
First, because securities litigation is so high risk for defendants, these 
cases—should they survive motions to dismiss and obtain class 
certification—will almost always settle (and usually in a fairly 
predictable monetary range).22  As a result, securities litigation rarely 
reaches the “merits” stage, and the law evolves extremely slowly when 
                                                          
17. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 
GA. L. REV. 63, 78 (2008).  The PSLRA requires a plaintiff to identify each statement said to be 
misleading and plead particular facts giving rise to a “strong inference” of scienter.  In re Bos. 
Scientific Corp. Sec. Litig., 686 F.3d 21, 30 (2012).  The statute further provides for an automatic 
stay of discovery pending resolution of motions to dismiss.  Instituto de Prevision Militar v. 
Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2008). 
18. The SEC has won from between 72% and 92% of recent cases brought to trial. 
Proceedings of the 2007 Midwest Securities Law Institute, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 59, 98 (2007).  
These numbers suggest that the legal tools available to regulators can be effectively deployed 
against wrongdoers in serious cases. 
19. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Defense Against Outrage and the Perils of Parasitic 
Torts, 45 GA. L. REV. 107, 197 (2010) [hereinafter Rapp, Defense]. 
20. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 
2126 (1995) (stating securities class actions “have been a prominent feature of the American legal 
landscape for more than three decades”). 
21. In fact, this problem is one that recurs wherever legal regimes are constructed that are 
“parasitic” of existing remedies.  Rapp, Defense, supra note 19, at 198–99.  Securities fraud is an 
area in which existing legal rules were supplemented by federal statutory guidelines that took on a 
parasitic form.  See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 919 (“[F]ederal securities regulation is thus parasitic on other law, often 
including state-law principles of fiduciary obligation.”). 
22. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1570 (“[T]he sharp disparity between the corporation’s ability to 
indemnify settlement costs, and its inability to indemnify judgments established at trial in 
securities class actions, places overwhelming pressure on defendants to settle.”). 
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it comes to unpacking the nuances of securities fraud doctrine.  In other 
words, we largely know what it takes for a securities case to survive a 
motion to dismiss, but we know relatively little about what it really 
takes to win a securities fraud trial. 
Second, securities fraud litigation, as currently formulated, is 
characterized by an exceptionally high level of “elemental bleed.”  In 
other words, the considerations that are supposed to drive a court in 
deciding a single, isolated element also cloud evaluation of other 
unrelated elements.  Materiality, reliance, scienter, and causation should 
be separate analytical tools used to determine if liability is 
appropriate—the same way that oxygen and hydrogen atoms are 
separate constituent parts of water molecules.  Yet courts hearing 
securities fraud cases often look at the same types of studies and the 
same basic factual indicators to decide supposedly separate section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 elements.23  One cannot create more water with 
just a few more atoms of one of its constituent parts, but in securities 
fraud, the constituent parts mix into a confusing blur.  The result of this 
intermingling reinforces the difficulty of developing a clean 
understanding of the doctrine.  Securities law, though seemingly 
structured along the lines of clear rules (both judicially and through 
statutory reinforcement), is often muddled by “fuzzy standards.”24 
This Essay suggests that courts and the legislature should revisit the 
basic building blocks of securities fraud liability.  In the course of this 
project, the law should embrace and recognize the degree to which past 
attempts to formulate securities fraud doctrine are undercut by the many 
insights of behavioral psychology and experimental economics.  The 
results of such a rewiring would be drastic.  Accordingly, three of the 
basic elements of a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim25—materiality, 
reliance, and scienter—should be jettisoned (or at least fundamentally 
rethought). 
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to begin this project in a 
                                                          
23. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive 
Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 195–98 
(2009) (discussing the application of event studies to considerations of materiality, reliance, loss 
causation, and damages). 
24. See Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 
IOWA L. REV. 195, 225 (2009) (“Rules are said to be certain and predictable, and standards are 
said to be flexible and adaptive.  On the negative side, rules are said to be rigid and mechanical, 
and standards are said to be fuzzy and indeterminate.”). 
25. The basic elements of a 10b-5 claim of fraud are: “(1) fraud or deceit (2) by any person (3) 
in connection with (4) purchase or sale (5) of any security.”  HAZEN, supra note 4, at 445.  The 
first element, fraud or deceit, requires plaintiffs to show the components of common law fraud: 
“materiality, reliance, causation and damages.”  Id.  See also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (discussing the elements of Rule 10b-5). 
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recently decided case, Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & 
Trust Funds.26  The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on 
whether a plaintiff must prove materiality at the class certification stage 
(as required by the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits) or must simply 
plausibly allege materiality (as held by the Third, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits).27  The Court also had the opportunity to address whether 
defendants at the class certification stage must be afforded the 
opportunity to dispute the efficiency of the market for a security so as to 
rebut Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption.28  The Court decided 
Amgen in a somewhat narrow fashion, ruling that materiality was not a 
class certification issue.29  Thus, it may have missed an opportunity to 
further rethink the building blocks of modern securities fraud doctrine. 
II. MATERIALITY: NO ONE CARES ABOUT ANYTHING 
Only material misstatements or omissions are actionable under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.30  According to the Supreme Court, 
materiality is defined by the types of “information a reasonable investor 
would consider significant in making an investment decision.”31  
Courts’ interpretation of this requirement has been driven by common 
law concepts.32  Vague statements and “extremely contingent or highly 
speculative possibilities” are not considered material.33  Some degree of 
“puffing” or “sales talk” is tolerable,34 but the more probable a 
contingent result becomes, the more likely an omission or misstatement 
                                                          
26. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
27. WILLIAM F. SULLIVAN ET AL., PAUL HASTINGS, AMGEN PUNCTUATES CIRCUIT SPLIT: 
WHAT MUST PLAINTIFF PROVE TO ESTABLISH THE “FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET” PRESUMPTION 
AT CLASS CERTIFICATION? (2011), available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/ 
2056.pdf. 
28. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1198.  The court reaffirmed the premise of the fraud-on-the-market 
theory: “[T]he price of a security traded in an efficient market will reflect all publicly available 
information about a company; accordingly, a buyer of the security may be presumed to have 
relied on that information in purchasing the security.”  Id. at 1190. 
29. Id. at 1196. 
30. Review 71 v. Alloys Unlimited, Inc., 450 F.2d 482, 485 (10th Cir. 1971); HAZEN, supra 
note 4, at 447. 
31. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988).  See also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 n.10 (1976) (giving consideration to the “balance between the need to 
insure adequate disclosure and the need to avoid the adverse consequences of setting too low a 
threshold for civil liability” in determining the general standard for materiality). 
32. See, e.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 698 (10th Cir. 1976) (likening the 
materiality of misrepresentations to justifiable reliance on the misrepresentations in a Rule 10b-5 
action). 
33. HAZEN, supra note 4, at 464. 
34. Johnson v. Songwriter Collective, LLC, No. 3:05-0320, 2006 WL 861490, at *12 (M.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 28, 2006). 
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regarding that potential result is to be deemed material.35 
Richard Epstein describes securities law disputes on the meaning of 
materiality as having provided the opportunity to “test and refine 
traditional tort principles” but describes the matter as “verg[ing] on 
doctrinal chaos.”36  The problem presented by the Court’s current 
formulation of materiality is the difficulty in identifying what 
information a “reasonable investor” considers important.  Broadly 
speaking, courts have approached this question in two ways.  One 
practice is fuzzy, flexible, and derivative of the approach taken in 
Basic—to evaluate the relative importance of the information and then 
adjudicate its materiality.37  The second approach is numbers-driven— 
some courts have sided with the defendant when the plaintiff fails to 
prove that the alleged misinformation at issue was incorporated into 
stock price (such proof would typically come in the form of an “event 
study”).38   
Perhaps there is a better way. 
The SEC’s vision of the reasonable investor centers on the typical 
“retail” investor.39  The reasonable investor is neither a sophisticated 
money manager nor an electronically savvy day trader.  Rather, the 
reasonable investor is an ordinary person who invests money in 
securities subject to the SEC’s regulatory authority.  The doctrinal 
fiction surrounding materiality asks what that person considers 
important in deciding whether to buy or sell shares, ignoring the fact 
that the imagined retail investor rarely decides to buy or sell shares.40 
                                                          
35. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–19 (2011). 
36. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 20.09, at 564 (1999). 
37. See SEC v. Meltzer, 440 F. Supp. 2d 179, 190–191 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting a 
“formulaic” approach). 
38. Stephan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities 
Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 165 (2010).  See also David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” 
to be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 606 (2006) (“Some have argued that courts 
ought to equate materiality with market effects: when stock prices react to disclosures, we should 
presume that the disclosure was material to a reasonable investor. . . .  [I]f this is the solution to 
the problems this Article has uncovered, it may be an impractical one.”).  In the securities context, 
an event study gives a “market-based estimate” of “perceived fraud.”  Banks v. United States, 102 
Fed. Cl. 115, 192 (2011). 
39. Padfield, supra note 38, at 155. 
40. According to a recent survey, only 54% of Americans own stock.  Dennis Jacobe, In U.S., 
54% Have Stock Market Investments, Lowest Since 1999, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2011), http:// 
www.gallup.com/poll/147206/Stock-Market-Investments-Lowest-1999.aspx.  Of those owning 
stock, only 54% own individual stock (as opposed to owning stock through mutual funds).  
INVESTMENT CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 14 (1999), 
available at www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_equity_owners.pdf.  Moreover, of those owning stock, the 
majority, in a typical year, will engage in no transaction involving the purchase or sale of stock.  
Id. at 24.  The law’s vision of shareholders involves rational behavior, even though actual 
shareholder “behavior deviates from economic rationality in both predictable and unpredictable 
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Instead of trying to imagine whether a “reasonable” investor cares 
about a particular piece of information when buying or selling shares 
(which the reasonable investor rarely does), or looking narrowly at how 
a stock’s price has responded to some piece of information (something 
that surely has little to do with the actions of “reasonable” investors), 
courts should recognize that reasonable investors care about very little 
information.  All that should matter to an average, ordinary investor is 
the relationship between a particular stock and the investor’s broader 
investment portfolio.  In other words, only misstatements that go to that 
relationship should meet the current definition of “materiality.” 
Guided by the insights of Modern Portfolio Theory,41 one can argue 
that a reasonable investor should be investing in a diversified portfolio 
of assets rather than picking individual securities.42  Investors may act 
irrationally by picking stocks, but if so, they act unreasonably—the 
reasonable or rational investor does not place orders based on individual 
pieces of information about stocks.43  Any individual stock is selected 
based only on its relationship to the portfolio as a whole.44  “Stand-
alone” characteristics of individual investments matter only in relation 
to the portfolio.45 
Fraud, of course, is a “stand-alone” characteristic.  The reasonable 
investor cares about fraud only if the fraud upsets the relationship 
between a particular investment and the entire portfolio.  This situation 
would arise only if a firm dramatically misrepresents the nature of its 
activity or the relative risk and return associated with its business 
venture.46  Since this case is rare, the reasonable investor simply does 
not care about fraud in most instances. 
If one accepts the proposition that the reasonable investor does not 
care about fraud, one might take things a step further and wonder why 
investors would care about any firm-specific disclosure.  What does an 
ordinary, average investor do with a company’s numerous disclosure 
                                                                                                                                      
ways.”  Hoffman, supra note 38, at 543. 
41. See Michael C. Macchiarola, Securities Linked to the Performance of Tiger Woods? Not 
Such a Long Shot, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 43 (2008) (describing Modern Portfolio Theory’s 
diversification rationale as “generally accepted”). 
42. Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role 
for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 189, 247 (1998). 
43. Id. at 270. 
44. Id. at 271. 
45. Id. at 272. 
46. Arguably, this situation occurred in connection with Enron.  The company represented that 
its business was “logistics,” when in fact it was a “speculative trading company.”  Monica Perin, 
Enron Misrepresented Origin of Revenue Streams, Koenig Testifies, HOUS. BUS. J. (Feb. 2, 2006), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2006/01/30/daily41.html?page=all. 
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statements, updates, and annual reports?  She throws them in the trash.  
This is not to say that misstatements in such documents and disclosures 
should not be actionable.  Rather, it is to say that our current structure 
making them actionable is simply incoherent.  While other scholars, 
such as Professor Stephan Padfield, have suggested reducing the role of 
materiality as a “gatekeeper” for securities fraud claims,47 I suggest that 
the materiality element of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 simply be 
dropped for any claims involving fraud against ordinary investors.  As 
described below, any misstatement in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities should trigger a reduced level of sanction.48 
III. RELIANCE: FRAUD ON AN IRRATIONAL MARKET 
For a private party to recover under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, she 
must show that her injury resulted from relying on a fraudulent claim.49  
The Supreme Court has ruled that plaintiffs are entitled to a 
presumption of reliance whenever a misstatement or omission 
artificially affects a security’s market price.50  When securities markets 
are efficient, misleading information is “injected into the market” and 
can “move securities prices in an artificial manner.”51  For this shift to 
occur, the market must be sufficiently active to process information into 
price, and the misinformation at issue must have been made public.52 
Basic invited lower courts to develop a body of law for evaluating 
whether the market for a particular security trades efficiently.  Some 
courts favor a bright-line test, where all stocks traded on a major public 
“exchange” are treated as efficient and all over-the-counter traded stocks 
are treated as inefficient.53  Others prefer a multifactor test that 
considers trading volume, the number of analysts following a stock, the 
number of market makers, and empirical responsiveness to 
unanticipated announcements.54  Additional factors identified by courts 
taking this approach include market capitalization, bid-ask spread, and 
the stock’s float.55 
                                                          
47. Padfield, supra note 38, at 193. 
48. A sensible caveat would be to limit actionable misstatements to those of a substantive 
nature and exclude typographical errors from triggering liability. 
49. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 178 (1994).  Reliance 
is not required in SEC enforcement actions.  SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2012). 
50. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988). 
51. HAZEN, supra note 3, at 474. 
52. Id. at 475. 
53. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
1173, 1247 n.231 (2012); Epstein v. Am. Reserve Corp., No. 79 C 4767, 1988 WL 40500, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1988) 
54. Fox, supra note 53, at 1247 n.231. 
55. Bradford Cornell, Market Efficiency and Securities Litigation: Implications of the 
11_RAPP.DOCX 5/8/2013  12:24 PM 
1484 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
The problem with even the most sophisticated of these tests is that 
they miss the broader meaning of efficiency.  A stock might trade 
efficiently some of the time, for some information types, but then trade 
inefficiently at other times, for other information types.  A stock’s price 
might efficiently process a misstatement but then inefficiently fail to 
process a correcting statement.  Courts strive for a bright-line definition 
of materiality when the concept of materiality simply may elude such 
definition.56 
The result, unfortunately, has been a high level of inconsistency in 
the courts regarding what makes a market sufficiently efficient to 
trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption.57  The inquiry is 
expensive and time-consuming; yet it has become “one of the primary 
gatekeepers to class certification.”58  Basic’s adoption of the fraud-on-
the-market presumption of reliance was “explicitly justified . . . in terms 
of policy considerations, explaining that presumptions were widely used 
in circumstances in which direct proof is difficult.”59  The Court’s 
decision in Basic should be characterized not as founded on a now-
questionable economic theory, but instead as a policy judgment about 
the importance of private securities fraud claims. 
As I have argued in prior scholarship, rather than seeking to tread 
through the mess of “factors” identified in the lower courts as signs of 
efficiency, the Court should simply eliminate the requirement of 
reliance for secondary market plaintiff securities cases.60  Giving 
plaintiffs a presumption of reliance—either in the Basic fraud-on-the-
market sense or in the “omission” sense61—is intended to relieve 
plaintiffs of practical and evidentiary problems.  But the difficulty 
courts have faced in evaluating market efficiency has undercut the 
effectiveness of the Basic presumption at achieving this goal.  As in the 
case of many state securities fraud provisions,62 and in connection with 
                                                                                                                                      
Appellate Decision in Thane, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 237, 247 (2011). 
56. See, e.g., Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2004) (assuming that stock 
price must incorporate both cautionary statements and half-truths if stock trades in an 
informationally-efficient market). 
57. Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: The Misuse of Market Efficiency in Market Manipulation 
Class Actions, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1132 (2011). 
58. Id. at 1134. 
59. Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, WASH. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 18), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2153133. 
60. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving Markets Inefficient, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 303, 
327 (2002). 
61. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). 
62. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in State 
Court, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 476 n.69 (2011) (identifying state approaches that do not require 
reliance in privity actions). 
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other provisions of the federal securities laws,63 courts should not 
require plaintiffs to prove reliance. 
IV. SCIENTER: THE RECKLESSNESS CONUNDRUM 
Plaintiffs in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases must demonstrate 
defendants acted with scienter, which can be shown by either intent to 
deceive or reckless disregard of truth.64  Clearly, intentional 
misrepresentations satisfy the scienter element of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.65  The Supreme Court has yet to officially recognize that 
recklessness would fulfill the scienter requirement, but that is a 
proposition “the large majority of lower federal courts have accepted.”66  
Determining what kind of conduct falling short of knowingly made 
misrepresentations should be actionable is the thorny task.  Under the 
PSLRA, plaintiffs must plead facts that create a “strong inference of 
scienter.”67  The Act, however, provides little guidance as to what kinds 
of specific facts create a sufficiently poignant inference of fraud to 
survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.68 
While we have an idea as to what kinds of facts can negate 
recklessness—e.g., where a corporation’s disclosures are supported by 
reasonable reliance on outside experts—we know very little about what 
constitutes recklessness.  In a recent case involving the Madoff Ponzi 
scheme,69 the Second Circuit in Meridian Horizon Fund, LP v. KPMG 
(Cayman) held that “recklessness must be conduct that is highly 
unreasonable, representing an extreme departure from ordinary care 
[and] must, in fact, approximate an actual intent to aid in fraud being 
perpetrated by the audited company.”70  This approach to analyzing 
recklessness is similar to that undertaken in common law tort cases.  
Recklessness is defined as a midpoint between negligent and intentional 
                                                          
63. For instance, reliance is not required under section 11 of the 1933 Act.  James D. Gordon 
III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 59, 64 n.31 (2011). 
64. In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2012). 
65. In re Empyrean Biosciences, Inc. Sec. Litig., 255 F. Supp. 2d 751, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2003). 
66. HAZEN, supra note 3, at 458.  See also Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408–09 
(2001) (discussing the circuit courts’ adoption of recklessness as a basic for securities fraud 
liability). 
67. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007). 
68. HAZEN, supra note 4, at 459. 
69. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme may have had a satisfying ending, with Madoff sentenced to 150 
years in jail, but it also serves as a vivid reminder of the limitations of federal securities 
enforcement.  See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE 
SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf. 
70. Meridian Horizon Fund, LP v. KPMG (Cayman), 487 F. App’x 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(internal citation omitted). 
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conduct, and it is delineated by reference to and use of terminology 
evocative of both negligence (“unreasonable”) and intentional tort 
(“actual intent”).71  This standard leaves courts ill-equipped to divide 
recklessness from the two poles—negligence and intent—against which 
it is defined.72  What, for instance, does it mean to “approximate” 
intent, as the Meridian Horizon Fund court suggested a plaintiff’s 
evidence must establish?73 
The scienter element has “been confused to the point that courts 
sometimes simply say that recklessness establishes intent, which is 
nonsensical and, for criminal lawyers, as unpleasant as the sound of 
fingernails on a chalkboard.”74  It is unclear whether recklessness is a 
subjective concept involving deliberation (like intent) or an objective 
concept (like negligence).  Adding to this confusion are qualifications 
within recklessness developed by some courts—unpersuasive 
distinctions between “conscious recklessness,” “deliberate 
recklessness,” and “simple recklessness.”75  Simply put, courts are 
“mired in threshold litigation about the particularity and sufficiency of 
scienter allegations.”76 
Drawing on the insights of behavioral psychology and neuroscience, 
the effort to linguistically disaggregate human decision-making into 
negligent, reckless, and intentional categories may be doomed to 
failure.77  Courts may be searching for something that does not exist; or, 
at a minimum, searching for something that cannot, within the 
limitations of judges and juries, be found.  In fact, the one set of actors 
whose conduct seems to comport with doctrinal articulations of 
recklessness are teenagers and adolescents, who, outside of the social 
media industry, are rarely responsible for communicating with 
investors.78 
                                                          
71. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111, 
116–17 (2008) [hereinafter Rapp, Wreckage]. 
72. See id. at 118–19 (discussing the inconsistent and unpredictable court decisions defining 
recklessness, as well as the difficulty the American Law Institute has had in defining it in its 
Restatements). 
73. Meridian, 487 F. App’x at 640. 
74. Samuel Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 559–60 (2011). 
75. Rapp, Wreckage, supra note 71, at 136–40 (discussing the inconsistencies among how 
courts define recklessness).  See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 
1324 (2011) (assuming, without deciding, that “deliberate recklessness” can satisfy the scienter 
requirement). 
76. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Messy Mental Markers: Inferring Scienter 
from Core Operations in Securities Fraud Litigation, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 507, 509 (2012) 
[hereinafter Kaufman & Wunderlich, Messy Mental Markers]. 
77. See Rapp, Wreckage, supra note 71, 155–56 (discussing how behavioral science has 
proved that humans actually tend to underestimate risk as opposed to consciously disregard risk). 
78. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-
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In cases where conduct is labeled reckless, an actor proceeds on a 
dangerous course of action after miscalculating or failing to appreciate a 
risk.  But the actor may have acted under the much-discussed and 
robustly documented over-optimism bias,79 in which case it is difficult 
to say that the person acted with conscious recklessness.80  
Neuroscience has revealed the degree to which human brain functions 
are automated; in fact, the default way the brain works is through 
automated processes.81  This is what Daniel Kahneman calls “System 1” 
thinking, which “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no 
effort and no sense of voluntary control.”82  Recklessness, defined by 
reference to consciousness, does not leave room for the automated 
decision-maker, leaving us with both false positives and false 
negatives.83  Actors engage in a high level of self-deception—that is to 
say, they may have misled themselves about the riskiness of a course of 
conduct.  Self-deception is inconsistent with the concept of conscious 
decision-making84—what Daniel Kahneman labels “System 2” 
thinking, or “allocat[ing] attention to the effortful mental activities that 
demand it, including complex computations.”85  Recklessness as a legal 
concept is also cold and calculating, ignoring that decision-making is 
often guided by emotions,86 particularly in the face of risky situations 
                                                                                                                                      
Taking, 28 DEV. L. REV. 78 (2008) (discussing the difference between adult and adolescent risk-
taking and how mid-adolescence is the height of risk-taking and recklessness). 
79. Over-optimism bias describes the theory that people believe that negative events are less 
likely to occur to them than to others.  Rapp, Wreckage, supra note 71, at 155–57.  The 
quintessential example is drunk driving, as most people know the risk of driving drunk but 
believe they will be the “lucky ones,” and they choose to drive drunk nevertheless.  Id.  See also 
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 260 (2011) (“[P]eople tend to be overly 
optimistic about their relative standing on any activity in which they do moderately well.”). 
80. See Rapp, Wreckage, supra note 71, at 157 (arguing that because all people suffer from 
over-optimism bias and cannot truly appreciate risk, it is unfair to draw fine lines between 
negligence, recklessness, and intent). 
81. See id. at 163–64. 
82. KAHNEMAN, supra note 79, at 20.  See also id. at 21 (listing examples of automatic 
activities attributed to System 1, including detecting hostility in a voice, driving a car on a barren 
road, and comprehending simple sentences).   
83. Rapp, Wreckage, supra note 71, at 165.  While individuals make decisions automatically, 
some decisions are made through conscious thought.  Id.  When behavior results from an 
interaction between automatic and conscious decisions, people falsely attribute the process to 
conscious decision-making.  Id. 
84. Id. at 166–67. 
85. KAHNEMAN, supra note 79, at 21.  See also id. at 22 (listing examples of the highly 
diverse operations of System 2 thinking, including focusing on the voice of one particular person 
in a throng of people, filling out income tax forms, and checking the accuracy of a complex 
argument).   
86. See Rapp, Wreckage, supra note 71, at 168–69 (discussing how recent scholarship has 
demonstrated that humans act based on their emotions more than through conscious decision-
making, especially in ambiguous situations). 
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and danger.87 
So what is to be done to address the recklessness conundrum in 
securities fraud litigation?  There are two main threads in the 
scholarship.  One group suggests that courts look to verifiable indicators 
of recklessness.  The other faction simply wants to eliminate 
recklessness as requisite scienter—bifurcating securities fraud into a set 
of claims actionable via negligence and a set actionable only with proof 
of deliberation and intent. 
Dean Michael Kaufman and John Wunderlich’s work suggests the 
former approach.88  They argue that the objectively verifiable fact that a 
senior executive made a misstatement regarding the core of a firm’s 
operations should create an inference of recklessness sufficient to win a 
securities fraud claim.89  This proposal has some appeal—it eliminates 
the search for a speaker’s subjective state of mind in favor of a cleaner 
solution. 
Despite its appeal, this proposal invites two questions.  First, courts 
historically have been reluctant to use circumstantial evidence to 
establish recklessness.90  In a sense, Dean Kaufman’s proposal involves 
using “core operations,”91 the way tort law uses circumstantial evidence 
in res ipsa loquitor cases.92  My sense is that courts will be reluctant to 
do so, given the inherently subjective inquiry recklessness involves.93  
                                                          
87. While disclosures in the financial industry might appear free from emotion, the financial 
industry may in fact be characterized by a high level of irrational “Wall Street Macho” and 
arrogance.  See Elisabeth Prügl, “If Lehman Brothers Had Been Lehman Sisters . . .”: Gender 
and Myth in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis, 6 INT’L POL. SOC. 21, 31 (2012). 
88. See generally Kaufman & Wunderlich, Messy Mental Markers, supra note 76. 
89. Id. at 509. 
90. There are very few tort law cases discussing whether res ipsa is available to create an 
inference of recklessness, as opposed to negligence.  Those cases that do exist—mostly from the 
time of automobile guest statutes—hesitate to allow plaintiffs to use circumstantial evidence to 
support res ipsa.  See, e.g., Feld v. Borkoski, 759 N.W.2d 2, 6 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008) (res ipsa 
not applicable where plaintiff must prove recklessness), vacated 790 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2010); 
Johnson v. Johnson, 174 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Iowa 1970) (res ipsa will not support a finding of 
recklessness); Krell v. May, 149 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Iowa 1967) (same); Burghardt v. Olson, 354 
P.2d 871, 874 (Or. 1960) (same). 
91. A firm’s core operations concern is its “primary product or service,” as well as anything 
“that might affect the company in a significant way.”  Kaufman & Wunderlich, Messy Mental 
Markers, supra note 76, at 517–18.  The “core operations inference” is a “common sense notion 
that senior management is or should be aware of facts material to the company and investors.”  Id. 
at 518.  When senior management speaks on those matters and does so in a way that 
misrepresents, the inference would posit that such misrepresentations represented recklessness. 
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 (2010). 
93. In Puskala v. Koss Corp., securities fraud plaintiffs tried to use circumstances surrounding 
an embezzlement to show recklessness.  The court described the plaintiff’s’ argument as a 
“distorted form of res ipsa loquitor” and found it unpersuasive.  799 F. Supp. 2d 941, 950–51 
(E.D. Wis. 2011).  See also Gebhart v. SEC, 595 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Scienter, 
however, is a subjective inquiry.  It turns on the defendant’s actual state of mind.” (emphasis 
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Second, if one accepts the broader proposal that circumstantial evidence 
can establish scienter in securities fraud cases, why not take things a 
step further and allow “core operations” evidence to create an inference 
of intent?  In other words, the core operations presumption could 
provide an equally persuasive inference that senior managers acted with 
knowledge, thereby allowing recovery even if securities law rejects the 
idea that recklessness could suffice to establish scienter. 
The second approach involves doing away with recklessness and 
instead bifurcating securities fraud into two categories: the traditional 
core fraud/deception cases for which evidence of intent is required, and 
another cause of action for misrepresentation, for which negligence 
alone would be sufficient.  This proposal would structure the penalties, 
including damages, differently across the two categories.  Thus, while 
an intentional wrongdoer would face stiffer sanctions and have greater 
responsibility for investor losses, a merely negligent actor would 
receive less severe rebuke.  Though it stands against the statutory 
tradition of the PSLRA,94 this proposal is in fact consistent with broader 
shifts in American misrepresentation law, which increasingly allows 
claims for negligence in business relationships.95 
I suggest a third way to treat scienter in securities fraud litigation 
(though admittedly one closer to the second approach).  Instead of 
allowing claims for negligence, courts should allow securities 
misstatement claims to be brought through strict liability, with a second 
category, involving more serious sanctions, for misstatements with 
aggravation. Any misstatement would trigger liability, subject to a 
modest sanction, and evidence associated with a traditional scienter 
analysis would increase the gravity of an offense and trigger increased 
punishment or sanction. 
V.  PROPOSAL 
So what can courts and/or Congress do to clean up the securities 
fraud claims mess?  A more orderly, simpler approach would both 
ensure the deterrence and investor-confidence goals of federal 
regulation and protect defendant companies from meritless “strike 
suits.”96  Here are some preliminary thoughts about a different approach 
                                                                                                                                      
added)). 
94. The PSLRA requires particularized pleading creating a “strong inference” with regard to 
each misstatement or omission that “the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). 
95. Section 522 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts helped fuel the expansion of claims 
involving professionals who negligently supplied information.  See Jay M. Feinman, The 
Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813, 816 (2006). 
96. A “strike suit” is a “frivolous securities class action[] that [subjects] defendants to the 
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to securities fraud. 
Instead of modeling private federal securities fraud class actions on 
state common law fraud claims (with a confusing overlap created by 
various federal statutes), a better parallel might be state deceptive and/or 
false advertising statues.  These state approaches, of course, derive 
inspiration from the same kinds of common law claims as does federal 
securities law.  However, a number of states have adapted these 
common law requirements for reasons of practicality and in recognition 
that common law claims constructed around individual interactions are 
ill-suited for regulating disputes between a single defendant and a 
diffuse set of victimized plaintiffs. 
Secondary market securities fraud claims could be divided into two 
categories.  The first would cover “plain vanilla” securities fraud against 
a dispersed set of shareholders trading in a secondary market setting.  
The basic elements of a claim would be: a false statement, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security.  A modest statutory damages 
remedy would attach to each violation, allowing plaintiffs to recover 
without proving actual damages.97  Proof of individual reliance would 
not be required.  Also, instead of a presumption of reliance based on 
market efficiency, a rethought presumption based on the nature of the 
misstatement of omission would be embraced.  A plaintiff could bring a 
claim wherever the false statement “has the tendency or capacity to 
mislead consumers,” which is the fairly dominant approach under state 
false advertising laws.98  Scienter also would not be required.  As is the 
case with some consumer deception statutes, plaintiffs could either 
proceed without any proof of intent,99 or without proof of intent 
whenever an affirmative misrepresentation (as opposed to an omission 
or concealment of facts)100 was involved.101  Materiality, rather than 
                                                                                                                                      
unappealing choice of settling claims, however meritless, or risking extravagant discovery and 
trial costs.”  Freeman Invs., L.P. v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 704 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2013). 
97. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer 
Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 22, 23 (2005).  Plaintiffs might be called upon to prove a 
cognizable injury, without being required to prove actual losses. 
98. Id. at 19.  See Daniel D. Blinka & Thomas J. Hammer, Court of Appeals Digest, WIS. 
LAWYER, Nov. 2006, at 43 (explaining that reliance is not always required for false advertising 
claims); Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse by 
Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 24 (2006).  
See also Weinberg v. Sun Co., Inc., 740 A.2d 1152, 1169 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding 
individual reliance was not required to establish an unfair trade practice claim), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 565 A.2d 442 (Pa. 2001). 
99. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 97, at 20. 
100. The line between omissions and misstatements, unfortunately, remains somewhat 
“fuzzy.”  LOUIS LOSS ET AL., 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1655 (6th ed. 
2011). 
101. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 97, at 20. 
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being a required element of a plaintiff’s claim, would simply be 
presumed.102  A fee- and cost-shifting provision could incentivize 
attorneys to bring actions concerning securities fraud even in the 
absence of the availability of massive settlements.103 
Ultimately, an approach along these lines would improve the 
effectiveness of courts in resolving securities law disputes.  Courts 
would no longer require complex inquiries created by the current 
convoluted set of rules.  Plaintiffs could bring private actions to 
supplement governmental resources without exposing actors responsible 
for relatively “technical” violations of the securities laws to massive 
potential liability.  Freed from that concern, defendants could more 
vigorously contest the underlying elements of a plaintiff’s claim at trial, 
and greater clarity in the rules would evolve with a more significant 
share of courts resolving cases on their merits. 
In a second category of cases, additional “aggravation” could justify 
the imposition of higher statutory damages or even punitive relief.  
Sources of aggravation could include demonstrated proof of investor 
losses or high levels of intent to defraud. 
An obvious downside of this two-pronged proposal is that it would 
eliminate the “investor compensation” aspect of private securities fraud 
claims.  That result, of course, may not be a problem if one accepts the 
“circularity” view of private securities claims—that diversified 
shareholders are just as likely to be winners as losers in securities 
cases.104  Moreover, in appropriate cases, the SEC can utilize its 
recently expanded powers to obtain restitution and investor 
compensation.105 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has demonstrated that the three basic building blocks of 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 litigation—materiality, reliance, and 
scienter—are problematic.  Addressing these three aspects of securities 
litigation should be a starting point for the Supreme Court and 
                                                          
102. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965) (noting that materiality can 
be inferred from deception).  So long as the falsehood was capable of producing reliance, courts 
would deem it material.  Zahr Said, Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 99, 107–08 (2010). 
103. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 97, at 26–27. 
104. James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 579–80 (2012).  See also Coffee, supra note 3, at 1586 (arguing that it is an “inescapable 
fact” that the “securities class action is unlikely to afford significant compensation to 
shareholders”). 
105. Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 504 n.14 (2011) 
(discussing the SEC’s powers to compensate investors via disgorgement remedies). 
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Congress, but the remaining work to be done on other pieces of this 
doctrine deserves reconsideration.   
For instance, loss causation may improperly conceptualize the harm 
that results from securities fraud.  The causation component of a Rule 
10b-5 claim requires, in part, as the Court ruled in Dura, that the 
plaintiff establish a “causal connection” between the transaction 
and loss.106  Plaintiffs must show more than just an inflated price; 
instead, they must show an actual economic loss.107  Dura held that a 
mere drop in stock price after revelation of the truth behind a 
misstatement would not suffice.108  Later, in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co., the Court clarified that loss causation was a merits 
issue, not one to be determined at the class certification stage.109  
Despite this seemingly clear guidance, courts “continue to struggle with 
loss causation’s standard of proof.”110  Recent trials have involved 
competing experts, dueling event studies, and confused juries.111  
Loss causation is a problematic inquiry in part because investor 
losses are not the reason one worries about securities fraud.  Instead, 
securities fraud poses a policy challenge because it reduces investor 
faith in the market.112  Compensation should be thought of as an 
ancillary goal.  Deterrence and investor confidence arguably could be 
achieved in a cheaper, cleaner fashion if a statutory damages approach 
were selected for securities fraud claims, similar to that available in 
False Claims Act cases,113 Truth in Lending Act litigation,114 and under 
some state deceptive advertising laws and securities statutes.115 
Amgen represented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to begin the 
work of rebuilding a muddled and messy area of federal practice.  The 
Court chose the safe approach, deciding the case without revisiting the 
misshapen building blocks of securities litigation.  Work remains to be 
done. 
                                                          
106. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185–86 (2011). 
110. Andrew M. Erdlen, Note, Timing is Everything: Markets, Loss, and Proof of Causation 
in Fraud on the Market Actions, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 880 (2011). 
111. Id. at 916. 
112. SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 866 (2d Cir. 1998). 
113. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
114. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2006)). 
115. See Ryon M. McCabe, Statutory Damages Under the Florida Securities and Investor 
Protection Act: How to Calculate and Apply Rescission Damages, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 2009, at 32, 
34 (discussing the difference between statutory damages and compensatory damages in securities 
claims). 
